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3Introduction
Greece is undergoing major economic tur-
moil with a national debt of 143 percent of GDP
in 2011 and a budget deficit of 10.5 percent of
GDP. In spite of this heavy debt burden, Greece
needs to raise large amounts of capital in the
near term. In 2010, the European Union (EU)
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave
Greece the task of selling €50 billion of state-
owned assets enterprises by 2015 to private
investors. In order to raise €50 billion and
decrease its sovereign debt through privatiza-
tion, Greece needs to create an appetite for such
investment. The main goal should be to attract
foreign direct investment (FDI) to channel new
wealth into the Greek economy rather than
shuffling current wealth among domestic
investors.
The Greek government publicly owns
many large enterprises such as the Public Power
Company (PPC), the Public Gas Corporation,
Thessaloniki Water Supply Sewerage Company,
the Hellenic Telecommunications Organization,
Hellenic Petrolium, and Hellenic Railways Orga-
nization. The Greek government also has many
properties that could be sold through privatiza-
tion. For the purpose of this paper, these pub-
licly owned assets will be referred to as state
owned enterprises (SOEs). Greece’s SOEs own-
ership accounts for about 40 percent of GDP
(CIA). The privatization of these SOEs is an
essential step in revitalizing the Greek economy.
Although Greece has many large SOEs
to attract investors, the stability of Greece’s eco-
nomic and political environment raises much
concern. Since entering office in 2009, Greece’s
socialist government has sold relatively few
assets. Greece has had difficulty implementing
its privatization program, selling off smaller
blocks of shares rather than selling majority
ownership. This strategy raises a number of crit-
ical questions: (1) Greece has strong labor
unions, and the government fears opposition
from these organizations. Also, Greece is ranked
109th in ease of doing business, according to the
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International Finance Corporation’s survey on
the “ease of doing business,” and is therefore
unattractive to investors. Given this combina-
tion of labor militancy, a difficult business envi-
ronment, and the very deep economic crisis in
Europe, will Greece find qualified investors to
purchase its SOEs? (2) Is €50 billion a realis-
tic number or essentially a plug pressured by
the IMF, European Central Bank, and European
Union (collectively known as the Troika)?; and
(3) How can Greece implement a successful pri-
vatization program?
This paper examines the strategy and dif-
ferent forms of privatization, how privatiza-
tion can be used to strengthen a nation’s econ-
omy, factors to consider when designing a
successful privatization program, different
methods of privatization, and strategies by
which Greece can use privatization effectively
to establish more FDI.
Privatization—An Overview
Over the last three decades, privatization
—the sale of SOEs to private investors—has
been shown to be a viable strategy for govern-
ments working to improve economic efficiency
and stimulate growth. The sale of SOEs trans-
fers ownership and control from the govern-
ment to a single party or group of investors. 
There are many reasons why governments
elect to privatize. Factors include the current
economic climate and the impact a government
wants to make on its economy. Goals of priva-
tization include promoting economic efficiency
and growth, raising revenue for the state, cre-
ating an opportunity for competition and devel-
opment, developing a national capital market,
and ultimately relieving national debt (Lieber-
man et al., “An Overview . . . ,” p. 11). It is impor-
tant to note that privatization alone does not
directly achieve all these goals. Privatization
does directly relieve national debt, but pro-
moting economic efficiency, growth, competi-
tion, and developing capital markets relies
strongly on new private owners and the qual-
ity of the privatization program. This quality
requires governments to be fully committed
to a well-strategized privatization program that
will ensure a proper platform for these other
goals to be achieved (Lieberman et al., “An
Overview . . . ,” p. 3).
Developing a Strategic Privatization
Program
The development and implementation of
a well-strategized privatization program hinges
on several key factors. Political support, coupled
with economic reforms, and transparency must
be considered in the development of a suc-
cessful privatization program (Lieberman et al.,
“An Overview . . . ,” p. 7).
Privatization is a highly politicized
process. It involves the transfer of the nation’s
wealth, i.e. its “crown jewels,” to the private sec-
tor. Successful privatization requires resolve on
the part of the government. There are two types
of privatizing governments: populist and com-
mitted governments. Populist governments do
not privatize for future economic benefits and
do not necessarily favor privatization. These
governments tend to privatize due to political
and economic pressures to raise funds and
escape financial pressure. Some populist gov-
ernments seek to interfere, post-privatization,
to redistribute the value gained from privatized
firms. Committed governments, however, are
eager to privatize because of the long-term eco-
nomic benefits. A committed government allows
for successful privatization because it provides
investors with confidence that economic ben-
efits will emerge quickly. A privatization pro-
gram under a committed government with
transparency is seen as legitimate by investors.
Investors therefore have more confidence in
committed governments because they allow pri-
vatized firms to make major operational
changes that drive profits (Jones et al., p. 5).
In addition to the government’s commit-
ment, other important factors include the
endorsement of current employees of the SOEs
and the population at large. The general pub-
lic typically resists privatization because of the
potential for layoffs, reluctance to the transfer
of national assets to foreign control, citizens see-
ing themselves as losing stakeholders, and
uncertainty about the end result of privatiza-
tion. This resistance is why it is essential for gov-
ernments to be committed in order to medi-
ate these concerns to gain public support. To
this end, privatization initiatives must include
education programs that inform the public on
the benefits of privatization (Lieberman et al.,
“Privatization Practice Note . . . ,” pp. 8, 11).
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To increase chances of success, privatiza-
tion must be coupled with other reforms such
as measures to increase the ease of doing busi-
ness, simplify investment processes, and
improve environmental policies. When the cur-
rent business circumstances are not structured
for a private economy, these additional reforms
are necessary to create a more business-friendly
platform. In many cases these additional
reforms need to be put into practice before
the privatization program begins (Lieberman et
al., “An Overview . . . ,” p. 8–9).
Privatization programs must also follow
due diligence and maintain transparency. Spe-
cialists should be hired to ensure proper imple-
mentation, that all SOE transactions avoid
corruption, and that details of the program
are published and available to the public. Pro-
fessionals such as lawyers, accountants, and
investment bankers should ensure that sales are
conducted through competitive processes to
avoid negotiated SOE sales (Lieberman et al.,
“An Overview . . . ,” p. 9).
Indirect Effects of Privatization
Well-strategized privatization programs
facilitate the indirect goals of privatization: eco-
nomic efficiency, growth, competition, and
developed capital markets. Removing SOE oper-
ations from government control is often the key
to promoting efficiency and competitiveness,
largely because private ownership emphasizes
generation of profit. Ehrlich, Gallis-Hamonno,
Liu, and Lutter (1994) conducted a study of
23 international airlines between 1973 and 1983
to compare the effects of both private and state
ownership on productivity and operation costs
(cited in Megginson and Netter, p. 48). Their
study found that the change from state to pri-
vate ownership increased productivity and
growth by 1.6–2.0 percent and reduced costs by
1.7–1.9 percent each year. Because privately
owned SOEs emphasize profit maximization,
they are more likely to implement restructur-
ing measures to ensure economic viability. Fur-
thermore, privatization generates large rev-
enues for governments without raising taxes
and by cutting government spending. Between
years 1988 and 1999 governments worldwide
raised over $1 trillion through privatization
(Megginson and Netter, p. 6). Privatization
allows governments to capitalize on SOEs that
are failing, or performing poorly, under state
ownership. 
New opportunities for competition and
development arise from privatization. By sell-
ing off SOEs, governments open doors for
investors and entrepreneurs to develop compet-
ing businesses and participate in industries
newly available to them. Under private owner-
ship, industries improve because there is incen-
tive to develop and invest back into businesses,
whereas under state ownership there is very lit-
tle incentive for development because there is
no profit motive or competition when the state
is in control. 
National capital markets are created from
privatizations. Under state ownership, SOEs are
typically not traded in capital markets. When
SOEs are privatized through the selling of
shares—a share issue privatization (SIP)—
jobs and new wealth are created. New invest-
ing and financing opportunities arise when new
industries become available for trading and
development of new secondary markets. The ten
largest share offerings in history have been
privatizations, each of which generated more
than $12,000 million in revenues. According
to Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter, 30 of the
largest 35 share offerings have been privatiza-
tions (Jones et al., p. 44). In 11 European
countries, privatized firms are either the first or
second most valuable companies in their respec-
tive capital markets. These firms are responsi-
ble for large percentages of the total capital-
ization of those national markets (Megginson
and Netter, p. 44). 
The goals of promoting economic effi-
ciency and growth, raising revenue for the state,
creating opportunities for competition and
development, and strengthening national cap-
ital markets are all interrelated. For example,
when capital markets are developed, economic
growth derived from increased efficiency and
liquidity gives rise to new investment oppor-
tunities. Raising state revenues allows for appro-
priate and more efficient spending on infrastruc-
ture and community development in order to
increase competition. A subsequent section of
this article includes a discussion of how the
Greek government can use its capital to enter
into concession agreements to promote the
improvement and development of infrastructure.
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A concession agreement is an agreement
between a government and private sector com-
pany that divides the collection of revenues from
fees and royalties between both parties. The pri-
vate company provides needed services and cap-
ital investments in exchange for these revenues. 
Methods of Privatization
There are two ways to divest companies in
the tradeables sector (companies that buy and
sell goods and services): to sell assets or to sell
shares. Most privatized SOEs are transformed
first into shareholding entities through a
process known as corporatization, which pre-
cedes privatization. At this point the state
remains sole shareholder. There are several
methods for privatizing state-owned companies
once they have been corporatized. They are as
follows:
• Auctions—usually for smaller to mid-size
companies
• Management employee buyouts (MEBOs)—
also for smaller to medium size companies
• Tenders—closed or open tenders, usually for
larger companies
• Share Issue Privatizations (SIPs)—involving
capital market listings.
Privatizations often involve a combination
of these methods. For example, a large state-
owned group might spin off non-core, smaller
holdings for auction. Then a block of the core
business might be sold to a strategic buyer, who
is offered management control. Finally, the
remainder of the business might be offered as
an SIP on a domestic or international stock
exchange (Lieberman, Ira). 
An unfavorable economic environment
and uncertain perception of the viability of a
nation’s privatization program can make it
difficult to attract investors for SOEs. Alterna-
tive privatization methods can be used, along
with coupled reforms and regulations, to
enhance the platform for full privatization.
Alternative methods include corporatization,
contract management, contracting out, conces-
sions, and lease-purchase agreements. These
methods are strategies of divestiture that make
SOEs more market oriented, and methods such
as lease-purchase agreements reduce the
amount of capital an investor must initially
invest. Concession agreements are the best
alternative to privatization because the method
is the most market oriented (Lieberman et al.,
“An Overview . . . ,” p. 24).
The Greek Environment
The potential privatization of the Greek
economy is a unique situation in that the push
to privatize is mostly coming from external
creditors. Anecdotal evidence from newspa-
pers and interviews suggests that Greek citizens
strongly disapprove of privatization. Harder evi-
dence from opinion polls suggests that only
42 percent of Greek citizens have a positive
opinion of privatization (“How Greeks Judge
Privatization,” p. 9). The privatization of Greek
SOEs would be a major change in a long-stand-
ing economic structure. A new type of privati-
zation comes about with the current Greek
situation—privatization under duress. The IMF,
European Central Bank, and European Union
(i.e. Troika) strongly encouraged the previous,
populist Pasok government to commit to a
privatization plan.
In many ways it is similar to the situations
faced by Mexico after the 1980s debt crisis, by
Argentina in 1990–1991 with the need to resolve
a macro-economic crisis, including rampant
inflation and a large debt overhang and an
uncompetitive economy, and Turkey following
its financial/economic crisis in 2001–2002.
The IMF and World Bank pressed Mexico,
Argentina, and Turkey in similar fashion as part
of their structural reforms, following their
respective crises (Lieberman, Ira).
More specifically, the IMF and European
Union have put pressure on Greece to raise
€50 billion by the year 2015 through privati-
zation methods. These austerity measures, in
addition to bailout packages, should lower the
Greek deficit by cutting back on public sector
jobs, removing liabilities from the books of
the Greek government, shutting down unprof-
itable SOEs, and raising private-sector capital.
As a social welfare state, Greece not only has
more than 675,000 public servants as of August
2011, but also has strong public-sector unions
(“General Government . . .”). This transforma-
tion from a populist to a committed government
is a complicated process because of the poten-
tial discord between Greek government and 
citizenry.
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The Relationship between the Greek
Government and its Citizens
Public protests, some of which have been
violent, attest to the reactions of the people to
the actions of the government. On an inten-
sity scale from one to ten, 47 percent of Greek
citizens believe protests should be at an inten-
sity level of 10 with an average of 8.4 among
all surveyed (“Memorandum & Debt . . . ,” 
pp. 15–18).
The powerful Greek labor unions con-
tribute to the majority public opposition to
privatization. The Anotati Diikisis Enoseon
Dimosion Ypallilon (ADEDY) public-sector
trade union strongly opposes privatization.
ADEDY believes that privatized SOEs will
not have the ability to sustain further devel-
opment in areas such as utilities needed to
raise the standard of living for working people
(Gilson). In an interview with Athens News,
ADEDY president Spyros Papaspyros stated,
“We are fighting to block privatizations. The
impact of not having public hospitals, public
education, public electricity and water and
mass transit companies is tremendous. . . .
Here, a cost-benefit analysis is not enough—
you must compare cost to economic and social
benefit. In other countries where these serv-
ices have been privatized, the cost of living
skyrocketed” (Gilson). The ADEDY union also
believes that massive layoffs and the shrink-
ing of the public sector under the demands
of the Troika bailout package is against the
constitution of Greece. The main argument
from the unions against shrinking the pub-
lic sector is that a decrease in the number of
public workers will cause the unemployment
rate to rise even further (Gilson). 
A major problem is that Greek citizens are
not sufficiently informed about Greece’s finan-
cial situation. According to a Public Issue report
on SKAI Television and Radio, 60 percent of
Greek citizens are uninformed about the role of
the IMF, 74 percent have a negative opinion
towards the IMF, and 64 percent believe that
countries that have received loans from the IMF
in the past have not benefitted (“Memoran-
dum & Debt . . . ,” p. 47). Only 17 percent of
Greek citizens believe the Greek government
should continue to implement the measures
of its memorandum (recovery plan) with the
Troika, while 53 percent believe that Greece
should negotiate with creditors to pay only part
of its debt. 
Clearly, there is a disconnection between
the perception of many Greek citizens and
the plans for recovery. The majority of Greeks,
56 percent, believe that major changes are
needed; yet in contradiction, it can be said that
proposed changes, and changes currently in
practice, are widely unpopular (“Memorandum
& Debt . . . ,” pp. 52–58). It seems that a pos-
sible reason for this disconnect is that the need
for these changes is acknowledged, but many
Greek citizens do not see how they will bene-
fit from these changes. Essentially, Greek citi-
zens remain unconvinced of the need for
painful changes and prefer instead to keep their
current way of life. 
The views of the public sector can largely
explain this complacent attitude of the Greek
population. Public-sector civil servants cur-
rently have a favorable situation in Greece. Pen-
sions are easy to come by, retirement can occur
at a relatively young age, and labor unions pro-
vide job security. Greek citizens do not want
to believe that shrinking its public sector can
ease the burden on the Greek government
and its people. According to surveys, 33 percent
of Greek citizens believe that politicians are the
main cause of the Greek debt crisis. However,
only 2 percent believe that a bloated public sec-
tor is the main cause and, again, only 2 percent
believe that the lack of development and indus-
try is the main cause. Of the 28 percent of
Greek citizens who claim to have participated
in protests and strikes, 57 percent are public
sector employees and 14 percent are receiv-
ing pensions (“Memorandum & Debt . . . ,” 
p. 32). These data show that much of the dis-
connect between citizens’ beliefs and the recov-
ery plan is due to the influence of the public
sector. 
To implement any privatization strategy
effectively, the Greek government will need 
to manage appropriately the reactions of its 
citizens and labor unions; it will also need to
educate its population to dispel concerns 
and curb disapproval. This extremely unfa-
vorable environment makes the Greek 
government’s attempt at privatization a 
sensitive matter that requires a well-strategized
plan.
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The Greek Privatization Fund
(HRADF)
Greece established the Hellenic Republic
Asset Development Fund (HRADF) as a priva-
tization fund that is fully functioning as of
August 2011. Assets to be privatized are placed
in the fund and are prepared to be sold. It is
essential for the Greek government to play its
part in the privatization process and commit
to operating the HRADF effectively. For the
HRADF to operate properly, the Greek govern-
ment must continuously place assets into the
fund, but it must also commit to preparing
assets for privatization through such meas-
ures as creating portfolios for real estate assets
and unbundling utilities. Delays and adminis-
trative complications impeded the process of
establishing the HRADF. Though there are con-
cerns about the government’s commitment, the
Mission (ECB, IMF, and EU inspectors) has
determined that the Greek government’s level
of commitment is satisfactory and has the assur-
ance of the Greek government that if receipts
collected fall short of its target, then larger
stakes of SOEs will be sold (“The Economic
Adjustment . . .”).
Strategies for a Privatization
Program in Greece
An SIP sale is ideal for larger corporations,
such as Greece’s Public Power Company (PPC),
Public Gas Corporation, and OTE Telecommu-
nication Company, to strengthen Greece’s cap-
ital markets and to encourage support from pri-
vate Greek citizens for privatization. Issuing
more shares into the market will develop capi-
tal markets. The ability to sell shares of large
corporations to multiple investors, rather than
to a single individual or small group of
investors, allows for the average citizen to
play an active role in the process. Providing cit-
izens, many of whom would be public sector
employees, with the shares of these SOEs would
immediately show that privatization has direct
benefits (Jones et al., p. 2). It is important to
note that privatization is usually defined as
the sale of 51 percent or greater of an SOE.
Greece seems to be selling share parcels or
blocks and is maintaining control through
majority share ownership. This tactic is unlikely
to attract the type of strategic investors needed
to restructure and modernize Greek industry
and enhance competitiveness. Government
residual share ownership allows the government
to have control and interfere, increasing the
chances of corruption. 
While it is appropriate for Greece to sell its
larger SOEs through SIPs, smaller SOEs should
be privatized through auction and concession
agreements. The organizational structure of
smaller SOEs is simpler and less regimented
than that of the larger SOEs, which allows more
room for owner influence and future develop-
ment to improve operations. Many of the SOEs
under this category lack funds and attention
from the state to develop. For example, the
Ellinikon Old Airport is a large piece of land that
has been vacant for many years, though there
have been a few proposals for its use. Another
example is the highway system project that
the government has been struggling to com-
plete due to a lack of capital. The highway sys-
tem will be discussed in more detail in a sub-
sequent section of this article. 
Early Efforts in the Greek
Privatization Program
Greece already has some experience with
privatization, but it certainly has not been a
recent strategy. Privatization in Greece has
slowed drastically since 1998 when €2,104
million were raised through privatization. In
comparison, Greece raised €848 million through
privatizations in 2009, and only €7 million in
2010 (“Greek Privatization Revenues . . .”). 
Greece’s current debt situation and its conse-
quent need to raise additional funds caused a
major spike in privatization efforts in 2011. This
need and responding effort are likely to remain
high in coming years. 
By the end of September 2011, the first
privatization transactions of the HRADF were
completed. These transactions involved the sale
of a stake of the OTE Telecommunication Com-
pany, and concession agreements involving casi-
nos. These transactions raised €1.2 billion in
receipts, but only €392 million from the sale
of a 10 percent stake in OTE have actually
been collected. By the end of November 2011,
receipts of €849 million from the gambling con-
cessions are to be collected, and an additional
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€86 million are expected by the fourth quarter
of 2013 (“The Economic Adjustment . . .”).
Using an SIP Strategy in Greece
An SIP strategy will be effective in priva-
tizing Greece’s Public Power Company (PPC).
PPC is the biggest power generator, the only
power supplier, and the overall largest busi-
ness in Greece (PPC). The large size of the
PPC and all its different segments make it
ideal for privatization through an SIP. The trad-
able sector for utilities can be broken down into
stand-alone economic components, and PPC
can be broken down into electrical generation
and electrical distribution. Rather than having
one company that does both, multiple compa-
nies can provide these different processes. 
Shares of PPC can be issued through a pri-
vate tender offer, where an investment bank
advises and assists the government in soliciting
interest from a group of qualified investors.
Qualified investors must be in the same line
or related line of business with sufficient
resources to purchase companies and restruc-
ture them, post-privatization. The buyer ideally
has technological know-how and market access
in world markets to ensure viability. IPOs are
typically used when there is a high volume of
interested investors.1 The current economic sit-
uation, where market prices are low, requires
additional caution. If the Greek government is
optimistic that the markets will rise, it would be
strategic to sell only a portion of the shares
initially and then wait to sell more when the
markets rise. Using this staggered-sale method
and selling at a discount could cause prob-
lems for the Greek government because of
privatization under duress. These methods may
not generate the adequate funding needed to
raise the revenues required by the IMF and
European Union bailout agreement. These prob-
lems explain why the Greek government needs
to find an optimal mix between a staggered
SIP and underpricing (i.e. selling shares for
below market prices).
The Greek government also has to consider
its options in regard to restructuring PPC. It
would be best if restructuring did not take
place before the sale of an SOE. The problem
is that it is hard to attract investors to buy
large companies that are both vertically and hor-
izontally integrated the way Greece’s PPC is.
Investors prefer SOEs that they can easily pic-
ture taking over. Therefore, some restructur-
ing needs to be done—but as little as possible
(Lieberman et al., “An Overview . . . ,” p. 21).
In regard to PPC, the Greek government should
limit restructuring to the letting go of excess
workers, reorganizing its debt, and auctioning
off its subsidies. This process of restructuring
is needed for most large corporations in infra-
structure, energy, and natural resources, such
as PPC. For successful privatization, a strong
framework of new reforms and regulations must
be put in place to allow these businesses to be
competitive in a market-oriented economy. This
process is more gradual compared with that of
tradable and small businesses (Lieberman et
al., “An Overview . . . ,” pp. 20–21).
Another interesting aspect of the SIP
approach is its potentially favorable impact on
the political environment. In his analysis of
the relationship between political and economic
objectives, North (1994) claims that without
transaction costs every issue can be worked out
through a private market (pp. 360–66). Jones,
Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999) add to
North’s (1994) argument by stating that, since
no political system is realistically as efficient
as North suggests, it is possible for parties
affected negatively to receive benefits (Jones
et al., “An Overview . . . ,” p. 9). PPC labor unions
and employees can benefit from the SIP in
exchange for cooperating with the privatization
program. This benefit can be achieved by sell-
ing a percentage of PPC shares directly to cur-
rent employees in order to show how they can
directly benefit from the privatization. As labor
unions and employees are pleased by this
exchange there will be growing support of the
Greek government through this privatization
process. 
The Use of Concession Agreements
for the Greek Motorway Project
The motorway construction project
already in progress demonstrates how conces-
sion agreements can be used as a proxy for
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1A tender offering can be combined with an IPO.
The tender attracts a strategic buyer and the subsequent
IPO is generally more successful with investors knowing
that a strategic investor is managing the company. 
privatization and thereby encourage investment
in Greece. In 2007 and 2008, the Greek gov-
ernment completed its plans to begin construc-
tion on five major motorway projects through
the “Development of Motorways” program of the
Ministry of Environment and Public Works. The
Greek government decided to engage in conces-
sion agreements with five privately operated
international and Greek construction compa-
nies that would fund, construct, and operate the
motorways. In three of the agreements the
Greek government will share toll revenues,
while in the other two agreements the Greek
government will pay an operation subsidy to
help fund the projects (Smyrnioudis).
One of these projects is the reconstruction
and improvement of the Maliakos-Kleidi Motor-
way, which runs north/south from Kleidi to
Raches on Maliakos Bay—a 230 kilometer sec-
tion of the National Road that links Thessaloniki
and Athens. In June 2007, the Greek government
signed a concession agreement with Aegean
Motorway S.A. which will finance, construct, and
operate the motorway for 30 years and then hand
the motorway over to the state in year 2038. The
Greek government contributed €296,000 (22.77
percent of the total initial funding) to this
project, and after construction half of the rev-
enues generated from the highway will be given
back to the state for reinvestment in other
projects (Gatsonis, pp. 5–12).
With the use of concession agreements,
the Greek government was able to begin con-
struction on these 5 major projects while avoid-
ing a large financial burden and the responsi-
bility for operating and maintaining the
motorways. By releasing this responsibility, the
Greek government has decreased its liabilities
rather than increasing its debt. 
The construction of the Maliakos-Kleidi
Motorway is also an example of the benefits of
private ownership. To enhance the quality of the
motorway, the Greek government made addi-
tional improvements that would not have been
possible in a solely state-funded project. Aegean
Motorway S.A. has purchased motorway clean-
ing, maintenance, road service, and patrolling
vehicles strictly for use on the Maliakos-Kleidi
Motorway. It has also added motorist service sta-
tions and has provided mile markers and an
emergency service for drivers to call for emer-
gencies (Gatsonis, pp. 10, 17–18, 23–26).
Although there has been success with
the Maliakos-Kleidi Motorway project, parts of
the motorway are still not complete, and the
overall “Development of Motorways” project has
encountered many delays due to problems with
financing. As revenue forecasts were updated,
the viability of the project was jeopardized
and, as a result, construction stopped. It is
important for the privatization program that the
long-term viability of these projects to be agreed
upon and construction resume. For the privati-
zation program, the Greek government intends
to monetize these concession agreements by
assigning rights to future revenues to a pri-
vate company whose shares will be sold to
investors (Smyrnioudis). 
Increasing Investment Interest
through Necessary Reforms
In order to attract investors, the Greek
government needs to build confidence in an
optimistic future by creating a proper platform.
To this end, the business environment of Greece
must be reformed, the support of Greek citizens
must increase, and, most importantly, the Greek
government must show its commitment to
the privatization program. 
The business environment of Greece is
inefficient and burdensome for both starting
and investing in businesses. Of 183 coun-
tries, Greece is ranked 109th for the ease of
doing business and 154th for protecting
investors (“Doing Business . . .”). To attract
investors, the Greek government must improve
its currently unfavorable and unattractive con-
ditions for business operation. The Greek
government has a drafted “Business Friendly
Action Plan,” but does not want to present
the plan to the public until a newly related law
is drafted and announced. This draft action
plan includes actions related to simplifying
business processes and rules (“The Economic
Adjustment . . .”).
Reforms also need to be made to the Fast
Track program that provide a simple stream-
lined process for investors who must invest
€200,000,000 or more and provide 200 new jobs
(“Fast Track”). The idea behind the program is
to prioritize larger investors who will invigor-
ate the economy by investing more money than
will smaller investors. The problem with the
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program is that there are few investors, if any,
who are willing to invest €200,000,000 in Greece
to make this program viable. 
Conclusion
Unique to the privatization of the Greek
economy is the relationship between the Greek
government and its citizens, as well as its rela-
tionship with the Troika and the pressure it
places on Greece. The result is a situation of pri-
vatization under duress. The Greek government
needs to use privatization to raise revenues of
€50 billion by 2015, but because of the nature
of these relationships, the time and care needed
to ensure a successful privatization program,
and the current economic climate, this bench-
mark may be unrealistic. 
With little room for negotiation, the Greek
government must take whatever it can with
little money spent on restructuring. To attract
direct foreign investment, signs of future eco-
nomic optimism must be apparent. For this rea-
son, the Greek government needs to focus
domestically first. Laws and processes for con-
ducting business must be reformed, and the pri-
vatization program needs to be put into action
with strategies to gain the support of the Greek
citizens. 
The timing of the required €50 billion does
not comply with the time needed to tackle
domestic issues, attract large investors, and
accept the discounted prices at which the Greek
government will have to sell its SOEs. It seems
that there is opportunity for Greece to privatize
its SOEs, but requirements of the Troika are too
harsh for the necessary privatization tactics to
take place to ensure success of the Greek pri-
vatization program and the future economic sta-
bility of Greece. 
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